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This Article is centered on the proposal of a new model of corporate
decision-making: the enlightened sovereign control paradigm. In revisiting
the long-standing academic debate on the corporate objective, typically
enshrined in the dichotomy between shareholder value and stakeholder
theory, a critique of these existing models is put forward. In particular, it
questions the ability of the existing theories to take account of the complex
and multidimensional risks that are created by the company which affect
different constituencies both inside and outside the company. While the
global financial crisis of 2008 reignited the urgency to further define an
appropriate legal framework for decision-making in large public firms, there
have not been many substantial changes within the legal and business circles
regarding the way this problem is treated.
The Article is grounded in the recognition of the historical quest to find
a legitimization of corporate power, and attempts to create a system of public
accountability that could justify managerial decision-making. These tasks
have become ever more central in the wake of the many scandals that
exploded from the early 2000s to the present day, showing that many
constituencies can suffer from the externalities of corporate activities.
While much has been written on this topic, more recent events illustrate
the need to find an alternative approach to the question of the corporate
objective. This is because of its centrality in defining legal strategies to
control managerial behavior, but also because of the shortcomings of
existing paradigms. The asserted urgency to find a new theoretical model to
govern managerial actions and coordinate them with the interests of different
constituencies leads to the proposition of a new theory. The enlightened
sovereign control paradigm flows from a pluralistic theoretical foundation
and provides a novel, legal, and institutional framework for the balancing of
different interests that are affected by the behavior of large public
corporations.
* Lecturer in Commercial Law, School of Law, University of Manchester. I thank Dr.
Michael Galanis and Professor Hazel Carty for very insightful comments on a previous draft
of this article. Errors remain my own.
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INTRODUCTION
“. . . the liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people
tolerate the growth of private power to a point where it
becomes stronger than their democratic state itself. That, in
its essence, is Fascism – ownership of Government by an
individual, by a group, or by any other controlling private
power. . . . Among us today a concentration of private
power without equal in history is growing.”
F.D. Roosevelt1
“The rise of the modern corporation has brought a
concentration of economic power which can compete on
equal terms with the modern state.”
A.A. Berle2
This Article revisits the long-standing academic debate on the corporate
objective, typically enshrined in the question of in whose interest should large
public corporations be run. This has been traditionally addressed by twomain
theoretical paradigms: shareholder value and stakeholder theory. The global
financial crisis of 2008 (GFC) and the events thereafter have reignited the
urgency to firstly, further define this theoretical debate, or expand it beyond
the above dichotomy, and secondly, find an appropriate legal framework to
address the fundamental question of corporate decision-making.
Notwithstanding the necessity to recalibrate problems related to corporate
decision-making, neither of the above questions has resulted in substantial
changes in the way the problem of the corporate objective is theorized and
treated in business and legal circles.3
Post-crisis regulation has failed to address the fundamental issue of the
corporate goal and it has also failed to reassess—at the higher level—the
purpose (and scope) of regulatory intervention. Both questions are very
central to this debate because they involve, inter alia, defining the rationale
for public intervention in corporate affairs and more generally, the degree to
which private corporate interests should be subservient to social priorities.4
1. Franklin D. Roosevelt, 32nd President of the United States, Message to Congress on Curbing
Monopolies (Apr. 29, 1938) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?
pid=15637#axzz1Ze7GRv3W) [hereinafter Roosevelt’s Message to Congress].
2. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 313 (rev. ed. 1967).
3. Despite interesting and thought-provoking proposals: see generally Andrew Keay,
Ascertaining the Corporate Objective: An Entity Maximisation and Sustainability Model, 71 MOD.
L. REV. 663 (2008) [hereinafter Keay, Ascertaining the Corporate Objective]; see also Dr. Daniel
Attenborough, Giving Purpose to the Corporate Purpose Debate: An Equitable Maximisation and
Viability Principle, 32 LEGAL STUD. 4 (2012).
4. See Justin O’Brien, Back to the Future: James M. Landis, Regulatory Purposes and the
Rationale for Intervention in Capital Markets, in INTEGRITY RISK AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN
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The question of public interest came to the fore in 2014 in the context of
the attempted hostile takeover of UK pharmaceutical giant AstraZeneca by
its U.S. counterpart Pfizer. Pfizer’s bid sparked heated political debates
because of the consequences that the takeover would have had on research
and development in the UK pharmaceutical sector.5 The widespread
perception was that Pfizer’s strategy was aimed at breaking up AstraZeneca
and eventually selling off its assets.6 While a high bid could have met target
shareholders’ favor, other more pressing socio-political concerns reflected
the long-term impact that the transaction could have had on the United
Kingdom’s science and research environment, with losses of jobs and
infrastructures following the acquisition of the largest British drug-maker.7
This in particular led labor representatives to invoke a public interest test on
sensitive takeovers in order to block transactions that have a negative impact
on the national economy.8
Eventually, Pfizer’s offer was rejected by AstraZeneca’s board, despite
pressure from some of its shareholders to reconsider the bid.9 This situation
exemplifies the aforementioned friction between the private interest of
shareholders, concerned with reaping the benefit of their investment (mostly
in the short-term), and the broader public interest, reflected in this case by
issues of science and research development. It is in the context of these highly
topical junctures that this Article contributes a new approach to the problem
CAPITALMARKETS – REGULATING CULTURE 41, 59–60 (Justin O’Brien & George Gilligan, eds.,
2013).
5. AstraZeneca was at that time considered the largest pharmaceutical company in the United
Kingdom. It was argued at the time of the hostile bid that research and development in new
pharmacological treatments and products in the United Kingdom was effectively, to a substantial
degree, reliant on AstraZeneca and its strategic priorities to direct funding toward research.
Concerns about the taking over of this particular company were thus not so much driven by the fact
that the bidder was an overseas firm, but rather by the reputation that Pfizer had built as a “short-
term raider” of competing businesses. The proposed takeover, it was felt, would have therefore
compromised pharmaceutical research in the United Kingdom as a whole. See Andrew Ward &
David Crow, Pfizer and AstraZeneca: One Year After Deal that Never Was, FIN. TIMES (May 26,
2015), https://www.ft.com/content/e8320ccc-0327-11e5-8333-00144feabdc0.
6. See Martin Wolf, AstraZeneca Is More Than Investors’ Call, FIN. TIMES (May 8, 2014),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6fe31054-d691-11e3-b251-00144feabdc0.html#axzz33PqNE3d6.
7. See Julia Kollewe, Labour Threatens to Block AstaZeneca Takeover Bid If It Wins 2015
Election, THE GUARDIAN (May 16, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/16/la
bour-threatens-to-block-astrazeneca-deal-if-it-wins-election.
8. Id.
9. See Rupert Neate, AstraZeneca Tells Shareholders to Stop Pressuring It to Reconsider
Pfizer, THE GUARDIAN (May 20, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/may/20/astra
zeneca-chairman-leif-johansson-shareholders-pressure-pfizer. It needs to be noted though, that
Pfizer never reached the stage of making a firm hostile bid for AstraZeneca, mainly for two reasons:
namely the public bashing that this was already causing, and secondly, the rules introduced by the
Takeover Code following the Cadbury acquisition by Kraft in 2010, which limited the time between
the bidder’s initial announcement and its firm offer to 28 days. See AdamBogdanor, The Regulators
Were Right to Force Pfizer’s Hand, FIN. TIMES (May 28, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/a476f
df0-e5bc-11e3-a7f5-00144feabdc0.
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of balancing diverging interests in the decision-making process of large
public corporations.
In Part I, this Article defines the importance and the difficulty of directing
decision-making processes in large public corporations. This is followed, in
Part II, by a critique of the two existing models of corporate management
(shareholder value and stakeholder theory), which highlights each theory’s
assumptions and the impact that each has on the running of large public firms.
While much has been written on the topic, the unfolding of events within the
GFC shows that the need to find an alternative approach to the issue of the
corporate objective remains, mainly because of its centrality in defining legal
strategies to control and direct managerial behavior, but also because of the
shortcomings of the above models.
The asserted urgency to find a new theoretical model to govern
managerial actions and align such actions with the interests of a broader range
of constituencies leads to the proposition of a new framework. In Part III, the
enlightened sovereign control (ESC) paradigm is put forward as an
alternative model to shareholder value and stakeholder theory. In proposing
a pluralistic theoretical foundation, the ESC provides the background for
more specific measures to regulate managerial behavior and channel
decision-making in boards of directors.
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: THE IMPORTANCE OF
DECISION-MAKING IN LARGE PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
The ongoing economic crisis, sparked in 2008, has re-evoked memories
of the Great Depression and, more surprisingly, of the regulatory and policy
concerns that emerged at that time. The quotes at the beginning of this Article
reflect striking similarities with some of the current issues faced within both
academic and political circles. While President Roosevelt pointed in more
general terms to the concentration of private power as a threat to the functions
of a democratic state, Adolf Berle had framed the problem by identifying
public corporations as the vehicle that elicits the concentration of private
power, which could supersede the democratic state and escape regulation.10
This section provides a background to this Article’s main theme as it
explains why it is important to establish sound mechanisms of decision-
making in large public corporations.
Large public corporations11 have reached a new zenith. In the age of
globalization, their position within society has become increasingly central
10. See Roosevelt’s Message to Congress, supra note 1.
11. Large public firms are referred to in this Article as listed corporate entities that, because of
their size and activities, create externalities on a varied range of constituencies. Examples of this
category are represented by financial institutions, multinational corporations, or companies
involved in the extraction of natural resources. This categorization will be discussed in more detail
in the second part of this Article. For an explanation of what is meant by “large companies,” see
J.E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 4 (2002).
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because they stand as catalysts of financial, economic, and social changes.
While this was already recognized by Berle, the magnitude of corporate
power has today reached a new dimension. One reason for this is the much-
augmented interplay between corporations and capital markets that has taken
place since the 1980s in the United Kingdom and the United States. The
liberalization and then the progressive deregulation of financial centers
(chiefly London and New York, but this process extended globally) created
new opportunities for multinational corporations to diversify sources of
capital and enhance their returns through innovative corporate finance
strategies.12 The increased interdependence with capital market logics
accentuated the alignment of corporate decision-making with the pursuit of
increases in share value (i.e., shareholder wealth maximization), which has
also become the main metric to gauge corporate success. The interest of
shareholders became preponderant in the context of financialized economies
and brought about a redefinition of corporate success, which is today
distanced from the concept of wealth creation.13 Even though the goal of
maximizing shareholder value is not prescribed by the law—both in the
United Kingdom and in the United States14—it has come to represent the
chief priority of corporate management, often to the detriment of other
constituencies that are also vital components of corporations.15
The process just described, referred to by Professor Lawrence Mitchell
as “financialization” of corporate law, has extended beyond the United
Kingdom and the United States.16 Although there are reasons to believe that
there is no “end of history” in sight for corporate law,17 the business model
12. This was already epitomized in the Enron-type scandal, where the company’s core business
became subservient to financial and accounting strategies aimed at short-term profitmaking. See
Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business
Corporation: Some Initial Reflections (Colum. L. Sch. Ctr. L. & Econ. Stud., Working Paper No.
203, 2002).
13. Wealth creation is understood here as the process directed at productive activities, as
opposed to mere financial activities which generate profits in the short term. For a discussion on
share buybacks as tools that allow management to increase the value of shares without really
creating any value for the company, see Lorraine Talbot, Trying to Save the World with Company
Law? Some Problems, 36 LEGAL STUD. 513, 532–34 (2016); see also William Lazonick, Profits
Without Prosperity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2014, at 50 (discussing share buybacks as tools that
allow management to increase the value of shares without really creating any value for the
company).
14. See Vincenzo Bavoso, The Global Financial Crisis, the Pervasive Resilience of Shareholder
Value and the Unfulfilled Promises of Anglo-American Corporate Law, 6 INT’LCOMPANY&COM.
L. REV. 213 (2014); see also LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDERVALUEMYTH (2012).
15. See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate
Objective Function, 12 BUS. ETHICSQ. 235, 242 (2002).
16. See generally LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY – AMERICA’S
NEWEST EXPORT (2001).
17. See Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 439–440, 468 (2001) (discussing the emergence of shareholder-value ideology); see also
David Kershaw, No End in Sight for the History of Corporate Law: The Case of Employee
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based on shareholder value (which could also be referred to more broadly as
shareholder capitalism18) has been widely exported over the last three
decades,19 giving rise to similar legal issues and socio-economic questions
across a variety of jurisdictions.20 Some of these legal issues have surfaced
repeatedly through a number of crises and scandals that occurred over the last
decade, and the GFC has proposed themwith new vigor. Generally speaking,
corporate governance problems can be encapsulated in the failure to establish
sound mechanisms of control over managerial behavior. This pertains to both
internal governance mechanisms, represented most prominently by the
function of non-executive directors (NED) on the board, and to external
mechanisms, which rely on market forces (chiefly the employment of stock
options, or the market for corporate control) and on the role of gatekeepers.
At a higher level, a more deep-seated corporate governance problem is
represented by the unresolved dilemma of the corporate objective, which has
become more urgent because of the widespread employment of shareholder
value as a parameter of corporate success.21
It is worth stressing that identifying the corporate objective with the
interest of one constituency—shareholders—proves more problematic in the
context of large corporations, because these entities are the offspring of the
cooperation between different stakeholders,22 and more importantly because
their actions can create externalities on a very broad range of corporate and
societal constituencies. In this context, the corporate governance problems
above are exemplified by the failure of boards of directors (BoDs) to weigh
different interests at stake and to understand the long-term risks related to
certain activities. Relevant illustrations in this sense are provided by the BP
oil spill in 2010 and by the behavior of most banks involved in the GFC.23
Arguably, the BoDs’ failures were all underscored by the intellectual bias
flowing from shareholder value rhetoric and from the short-term goals
embedded in it, which contributed to highlight the problem of
Participation in Corporate Governance, 2 J. CORP. L. STUD. 34, 37 (2002) (providing a different
perspective).
18. See Karel Williams, From Shareholder Value to Present-Day Capitalism, 29 ECON. &
SOC’Y 1, 6 (2000). It is observed that shareholder value is not a viable principle for industrial and
commercial companies which would have to compete for product market supremacy rather than
capital market supremacy, prioritizing therefore a different set of interests, namely product
innovation versus returns on equity holders.
19. See MITCHELL, supra note 16, at Introduction.
20. See Beate Sjafjell, Regulating Companies as if the World Matters: Reflections from the
Ongoing Sustainable Companies Project, 47 WAKE FORESTL. REV. 113, 129–30 (2011) (reflecting
on European and Nordic Company Law).
21. See generally Andrew Johnston, Reforming English Company Law to Promote Sustainable
Companies, 11 EUR. COMPANY L. 63 (2014).
22. See generally Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (analyzing the interplay between different corporate groups).
23. See Vincenzo Bavoso, Sustainable Companies Through Enlightened Boards: Combining
Private and Public Interest in the Decision-Making of Large Public Firms, 11 EUR. COMPANY L.
90, 90–93 (2011).
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“managerialism” originally noted by Berle.24 A brief illustration of the above
contextualizes the discussion of the role of shareholder value as a mechanism
of corporate decision-making.
In the case of BP, the oil spill unveiled the inadequate supervision of
high-risk activities related to oil extraction. The nature of BP’s business and
the repercussions of its activities on local communities in the Gulf of Mexico
prompted reflections on how the company was balancing different interests25
and the extent of its approach to corporate social responsibility (CSR).26 It
has been observed that BP repeatedly bypassed environmental legislation in
order to achieve short-term profits flowing from its oil extraction activities.27
BP’s business, in other words, was primarily focused on profitability,28 and
the company acted in a socially responsible way only insofar as this could
contribute to its “green image,” or when it would not hinder profitability.29
Decision-making at the board level showed that environmental concerns, and
more generally CSR, were considered subordinated interests to the creation
of short-term profits for shareholders. As it became evident, this went to the
detriment of many stakeholders whose interest was not represented on BP’s
board.
The facts of Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and its nationalization prove
the same points. In the pre-crisis years, RBS had become particularly
engaged in subprime lending, exposing the bank to high risks related to
complex structured finance products.30 While the company profited
enormously from participating in this market, it failed to oversee the risks
that were accruing due to increased levels of leverage and the insufficient
capital that RBS was operating with. Ensuing problems of liquidity meant
that the bank was highly vulnerable to market shocks.31 As it is well known,
RBS’ perilous position was further aggravated by the decision to acquire
ABNAmro in 2007. This was driven, inter alia, by desires to further increase
the bank’s asset growth. It also, however, resulted in increasing RBS’s
exposures to asset classes that were the subject of market concerns.32 When
24. See BERLE&MEANS, supra note 2, at 78.
25. See Nick Lin-Hi & Igor Blumberg, The Relationship Between Corporate Governance,
Global Governance, and Sustainable Profits: Lessons Learned from BP, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE
571, 574–75 (2011).
26. See Tineke Lambooy et al., The Corporate Responsibility to Remedy (3rd Pillar Ruggie
Framework) - Analysis of the Corporate Responses in Three Major Oil Spill Cases: Shell – Nigeria;
BP – US (the Gulf); Chevron – Ecuador, (U. of Oslo Fac. of L., Research Paper No. 2011-26
(2011)), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1953190.
27. Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social
Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BPOil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 983, 997, 1037 (2011).
28. See Gordon, supra note 12.
29. See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 27, at 1014–15.
30. See generally FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THEFAILUREOF THEROYALBANKOFSCOTLAND (2011).
31. Id. at 159–63, 267.
32. Id. at 324.
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the market eventually collapsed in 2008, the magnitude of losses and write-
downs at RBS forced the government to effectively nationalize the bank.33
The failure of the Scottish bank epitomized a business model in the
banking industry, conceived to maximize rates of return on equity through
aggressive asset growth and minimization of capital and funding risk.34 In
essence, this increased short-term gains for shareholders, while the business
risk was externalized onto other stakeholders and society.
Notwithstanding the lessons from recent and past crises, corporate law
has remained anchored to a legal form that is very close to that of its initial
modern codifications.35 Despite reviews and law reforms, it has been
observed that the current form of company law increasingly shows its
inefficiency to face the ever-changing challenges that are posed by new
corporate structures and by the ubiquitous influence of capital markets on
corporate strategies.36 This is the case especially in the context of leveraged
financial institutions where the risk-bearers are not only the shareholders, but
a broader range of stakeholders.37 However, while large public corporations
play a prominent role in society, their actions vis-à-vis societal stakeholders
remain unregulated or neglected by company law. This is largely due to the
narrow framework that is widely accepted as being the mandate of company
law, focusing chiefly on the relationship between shareholders and directors
(i.e., the agency problem), and giving way to the shareholder primacy
assumption.38 Under this view, the regulation of other relationships, namely
those affecting social stakeholders or the environment, should be left to
contractual negotiations or to specific regulation external to company law.39
The GFC, and the cases highlighted earlier, represent an ideal case study
to support the contentions made in this Article. Firstly, that the process of
corporate decision-making has been flawed and it has failed to correctly
appreciate issues of risk-taking.40 Secondly, that corporate decision-making
33. Id. at 319 (chronology).
34. See Marco Onado, Northern Rock: Just the Tip of the Iceberg, in THE FAILURE OF
NORTHERN ROCK: AMULTI-DIMENSIONAL CASE STUDY 99, 107 (2009).
35. See The Companies Act 1862 (UK) (which followed from the Joint Stock Companies Acts
of 1844 and 1856), which is widely recognized as the first comprehensive set of rules governing
companies.
36. This has been argued by Simon Deakin, Corporate Governance and Financial Crisis in the
Long Run (Cambridge U. Centre for Bus. Res., Working Paper No. 417), in CBR RESEARCH
PROGRAMME ON CORPORATEGOVERNANCE 1, 7–8 (2010).
37. It is observed that the ultimate risk-bearers in financial institutions are not the shareholders,
but taxpayers, by virtue of the implicit government bailout mechanisms. See Edward J. Kane, A
Theory of How and Why Central Bank Culture Supports Predatory Risk-Taking at Megabanks (Inst.
for New Econ. Thinking, Working Paper No. 34, 2015).
38. See Johnston, supra note 21, at 63–64 (Johnston argues that this assumption is flawed, and
policy-makers should consider broadening the scope of company law in order to take into account
the interest of a wider range of stakeholders.).
39. MARKMOORE, CORPORATEGOVERNANCE IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE 64 (2013).
40. In the financial sector, risk-management is a central task of the board because of the systemic
risk attached to certain products; these risks however, were repeatedly ignored or misstated in the
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can have an impact on a wide range of constituencies both within and outside
the corporate vehicle. In most cases though, these constituencies—namely
consumers, employees, creditors—have no say on how the company should
be run, and are not empowered by company law mechanisms to hold the
board accountable.41
II. A CRITICAL VIEW OF THE EXISTINGMODELS OF
CORPORATE MANAGEMENT
A. THEQUESTION OF LEGITIMACY AND PUBLICACCOUNTABILITY
IN LARGE PUBLICCORPORATIONS
The questions raised in the previous section lead to the fundamental task
of finding sources of legitimacy to the decision-making process in large
public corporations. Before providing a critique of the two guiding criteria of
corporate management, this section delineates the difficulties associated with
directing and controlling BoDs’ decision-making.
Traditionally, the central concern within UK and U.S. corporate law has
been related to the regulation of the agency problem.42 This flows directly
from the delegation of managerial powers to the board and the resulting
separation of ownership and control.43 The divorce of the two main
components of corporations (equity ownership and the relating management)
triggered the necessity to find a model of corporate governance that provided
legitimization to the decision-making process within large public
corporations. The resulting problem of managerial hegemony was initially
identified by Berle, who recognized that the modern corporate form
epitomized by dispersed ownership gave rise to a control void.44 While this
was considered an intrinsic feature of the modern corporation, it posed
questions of accountability and legitimacy.45 It is useful to appraise here how
years prior to the crisis. See generally HOUSE OFCOMMONS, TREASURYCOMMITTEE, THERUN ON
THE ROCK, 2007–08, HC 56–I (UK); see also U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011).
41. Under UK and U.S. law, the board of directors is delegated managerial power over all but
the most important issues (where shareholders’ consent is needed), and is accountable to
shareholders. This accountability link is problematic because the board is only constrained by what
shareholders perceive as acceptable. In the case of RBS for instance, as well as other banks involved
in the GFC, shareholders were not able to assess whether the profit-making strategies carried out by
the board were socially acceptable and in the interest of the market as a whole. See generally Joan
Loughrey, Breaching the Accountability Firewall: Market Norms and the Reasonable Director, 37
SEATTLEU. L. REV. 989 (2014).
42. See generally Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288 (1980).
43. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 301, 301–02 (1983).
44. See BERLE&MEANS, supra note 2, at ch. V.
45. Id. at 119–40.
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the pioneering work conducted by Berle approached the problem that is today
persisting in contemporary corporate governance.
Interestingly, despite acknowledging the development of capital markets
as a means of capital allocation, Berle remained dismissive of the powers of
the market as a discipline mechanism over managerial behavior. This
stemmed from Berle’s doubts on the informational efficiency of capital
markets, which he argued were reflected in the irrationality of investors’
decision-making and in their incentives to choose strategies often not aligned
with the long-term interest of the firm.46 As Berle was also cognizant of the
increasingly externalized (and arguably residual) role of shareholders in the
governance of corporations,47 the main source of direction over corporate
decision-making rested on professional managers who were tied to the
company through trust and property law mechanisms.48 While this did not
solve the accountability deficit and, if anything, further exacerbated it, Berle
also developed a theory of “public consensus” based on the existence of a set
of values endorsed by the community, and often by the corporation too. In
Berle’s rather optimistic view, the company’s decision-makers would not
disregard the interest of the community due to citizens’ increasing influence
on corporate affairs.49 Moreover, under this design the public consensus
would be enforced on managers because of a “corporate conscience,”
represented by managers’ perception of the public consensus.50 This is close
to what is recognized today as a firm’s reputation, described as “loss of
prestige, public standing and popular esteem,” which would undermine the
public trust toward the corporation.51 This represented a first level of informal
constraint over corporate decision-making according to Berle, and it would
be supplemented by more forcible measures in the shape of regulation,
reflecting the democratic force of the state reacting to a violation of the public
consensus.52
The idea that management would not act in a way that is contrary to what
is perceived as “public good” represented probably an overvaluation of the
democratic mechanisms available to the general public. Enforcing the lack of
consensus against corporate power (the board) was and remains today a
prerogative of shareholders, both in the United Kingdom and in the United
46. Id. at Introduction.
47. SeeMarc T. Moore & Antoine Reberioux, Corporate Power in the Public Eye: Reassessing
the Implications of Berle’s Public Consensus Theory, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1109, 1116–17
(2010).
48. See BERLE&MEANS, supra note 2, at 219–43.
49. The idea of public opinion was initially introduced in The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, and was later expanded in Power without Property: A New Development in American
Political Economy. See ADOLFA. BERLE, POWERWITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEWDEVELOPMENT IN
AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1959).
50. Id. at 90–91.
51. Id. at 91.
52. Id. at 114–15.
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States.53 In this sense then, the control void identified by Berle remained
legally unresolved, especially given his lack of faith in shareholders to be
able to bring about accountability in a wider context. This legal problem
persists today given that shareholders are unable to assess the extent to which
strategies endorsed by the board are socially acceptable or aligned to wider
interests.54
This argument is even stronger today, because institutional shareholders
(representing a large slice of the shareholder population in the United
Kingdom and the United States) are increasingly identified with hedge funds
and similar investment vehicles.55 These entities hold stock for short periods
of time, averaging eight months, and therefore tend to have little interest in
the company’s long-term success, with their main concern being represented
by quarterly gains.56 Ultimately, the solution to the accountability problem
envisaged by Berle seemed to be a “least bad” scenario, with corporate power
held by professional managers only theoretically accountable to a community
consensus.57
It is realistic today to say that accountability hinges on a private-type
legal relation between those who hold decision-making powers (the board)
and those who are seen as beneficiaries of those managerial power
(shareholders).58 These private arrangements are, in most cases, inadequate
for twomain reasons. Firstly, because from a legal perspective, as highlighted
earlier in this Article, this leaves the board unaccountable to a number of
constituencies (all but the shareholders in fact). Secondly, the
multidimensional nature of large public firms, with different layers of
management and a multitude of interested stakeholders, sits very oddly with
a mono-dimensional accountability framework that essentially relies on the
wisdom of one constituency in the company. This leaves an open question,
not only in terms of accountability, but more importantly of legitimacy. As
already stated, finding new forms of legitimacy to the decision-making
process of large public corporations remains an open task in corporate law
scholarship.
The question has been reprised by John Parkinson, who in more recent
times stressed the importance to find a public interest justification of
corporate power.59 The central argument of Parkinson’s work was the
53. See Bavoso, supra note 14, at 215.
54. Loughrey, supra note 41, at 1008–10.
55. Andrew R. Keay, The Global Financial Crisis: Risk, Shareholder Pressure, and Short-
Termism in Financial Institutions – Does Enlightened Shareholder Value Offer a Panacea? 10–11
(2011) (unpublished manuscript) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1839305 [hereinafter Keay,
The Global Financial Crisis].
56. Id.
57. BERLE, supra note 49, at 109 (Berle defines management as a “government of best minds.”).
58. Marc T. Moore, The Neglected Value of Board Accountability in Corporate Governance, 9
L. & FIN. MKT. REV. 10, 13 (2015).
59. See generally PARKINSON, supra note 11, at 21.
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recognition of public corporations as a force capable of shaping society. As
such, the public outcome of private (internal) decision-making needed to be
legitimized so that modern corporations could provide some form of public
or social purpose to the wealth they created. In essence, he viewed large
public firms as forms of social enterprises.60 This line of thought has been
supported by both legal and political theory. In particular, it has been
maintained that the possession by private companies of decision-making
power which has a social dimension is legitimate only if decisions are taken
in the public interest.61 It follows that society is entitled to ensure that
corporate power is exercised in a way that is consistent with the public
interest.62 Ultimately, Parkinson’s argument was not aligned with the
conventional wisdom prevailing over the last three decades—that pursuing
shareholder value would bring about benefits for all other stakeholders and
more generally that profit maximization was conducive to public interest
goals.63
The agenda espoused by Parkinson reflected to some extent the work of
Eric Orts, who, again in sharp contrast with the direction of mainstream
corporate scholarship, contended that corporate law should provide a
framework for legal and political legitimacy of decision-making.64 This
should take account of the technical and normative complexity of the
underlying process and therefore should result in more detailed standards of
behavior. While Orts accepted that the advocated legal and technical process
would increase complexity, he argued that this would be offset by the social
benefits deriving from the resulting standards.65
At this stage of the discussion it needs to be specified that the problems
so far debated are originally related to the Anglo-American corporate
ownership structure and its model of corporate governance. However, it has
been argued by Professor Mitchell that this model has been exported
globally,66 together with the process of “financialization” of corporate
governance, which inevitably attenuated the difference between shareholder
60. Id. at 23.
61. Id.
62. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Legitimacy, Conduct and Governance—Two Models
of the Corporations, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 6 (1983).
63. PARKINSON, supra note 11, at 41–42 (contending that there was no conclusive evidence
suggesting that profit maximization is consistent with public interest).
64. Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1565, 1596 (1993).
65. Id.
66. MITCHELL, supra note 16, at 7. Mitchell observes that globalized consulting, accounting,
and law firms sell advice based on shareholder value to companies in Europe and globally, and they
sell the U.S. way of doing business; moreover, legal and business consultants have contributed to
drafting Corporate Governance Codes in developing countries and imposed a model of Corporate
Governance based on shareholder value. Id.
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and stakeholder orientations.67 The global integration of financial markets
that occurred from the 1990s was mainly prompted by ideological
developments from the United Kingdom and the United States. These were
grounded on the undisputed reliance on market discipline and shareholder
value, and similarly, global financial institutions promoted the application of
the shareholder-oriented model across many different jurisdictions.68
However, as discussed earlier, there has been no end of history in corporate
law. Scandinavian countries, as well as Germany or France, have maintained
a more balanced approach to corporate governance and financial
development by prioritizing issues of social stability and welfare.69 This
argument is important for the present discussion because it shows that a
different model to control and direct corporate decision-making is possible
and it is eventually rooted in different ways to regulate corporate
relationships.70 This fundamental differentiation originates from a different
idea of corporation that emerged in Germany and other northern European
countries, and is still reflected today in a process of decision-making that
allows greater centrality to employees’ interests.71
Early German companies were already concerned with general welfare
interests and were geared toward social goals rather than simply the pursuit
of profits for shareholders, which characterized their UK counterparts.72
German companies were the product of a different regulatory framework
which reflected a type of capitalism centered on cooperation and pluralism,
where the state retained a central, and at times intrusive, role in steering
market players’ behavior toward these goals.73 Similarly, German financial
markets were traditionally characterized by the overwhelming role of large
banks vis-à-vis securities markets, which entailed a more limited access for
corporations to disintermediated sources of finance and less interdependence
with market logics.74
67. See Susanne Lutz & Dagmar Eberle, On the Road to Anglo-Saxon Capitalism? German
Corporate Governance and Regulation Between Market and Multilevel Governance
(FernUniversität in Hagen, CLPE Research Paper 4/2007), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=98
8696.
68. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 451.
69. See Williams, supra note 18, at 12. This also entailed that the interplay between corporate
decision-making and capital market logics remained lower. For a relevant overview, see Mark J.
Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities Markets, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 199 (1999);
Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 539, 539–606 (2000).
70. See Williams, supra note 18, at 11–12.
71. See Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance
Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J.
Roe ed., 1999).
72. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY
OF AREVOLUTIONARY IDEA 80 (2003).
73. Id. at 90–93.
74. See Horst Siebert, Germany’s Capital Market and Corporate Governance (Kiel Inst. for the
World Econ., Working Paper No. 1206, 2004).
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The challenges of directing decision-making processes in a more
inclusive way seems thus to be traditionally related to the Anglo-American
model of corporate governance, based on large public companies with
dispersed shareholding, driven by the pursuit of profits for shareholders.75
The following section will clarify this contention by illustrating the
shortcomings of the two main models of corporate governance: shareholder
value and stakeholder theory.
B. A CRITIQUE OF SHAREHOLDERVALUE
Since the 1930s, corporate law scholars have strived to address the
fundamental question of the corporate objective and clarify what
constituency should be identified as main beneficiary of corporate decision-
making. This debate originated at Harvard, around the contrasting views of
professors Berle and Dodd.76 The crux of the dispute was reflected in the
dichotomy between a minimalist and a maximalist stance on corporate
governance.
Professor Berle’s approach was grounded on the configuration of
managerial powers as powers held in trust, whereby the beneficiaries of that
trust should have been the shareholders as owners of the firm. This
minimalist position was grounded in Berle’s view of property law
mechanisms as tools to protect shareholders by creating legal safeguards
against management’s deviation from the ultimate profit goal.77 Professor
Dodd, on the other hand, advocated what was defined as a maximalist vision
of corporate governance, whereby the powers held by management were not
to be conceived only for the pursuit of shareholders’ wealth, but for the
benefit of other social groups too.78
The seeds of this quest have flown in more recent times into what has
substantiated the corporate objective dilemma. As already announced, this is
reflected in two models of corporate management that provide diverging
approaches to the problem of controlling and directing decision-making:
shareholder value and stakeholder theory. As will be explained in the
following sections, these two paradigms originated from very diverging
politico-economic assumptions developed in the 1970s and it is fair to say
that the recent GFC has contributed to reassess their appropriateness. A
critique of both models will be useful to better understand the difficulty to
channel corporate activities and provide sound mechanisms of
75. Johnston, supra note 21, at 65 (observing that smaller companies tend to be subject to greater
social control and are naturally constrained by social norms with respect to the effects that their
decision-making creates).
76. See generally E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1365 (1932).
77. See generally Berle, supra note 76, at 1365.
78. See generally Dodd, Jr., supra note 76, at 1145.
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accountability. This critique will also pave the way for the proposal of a new
paradigm, the ESC, as an alternative model of corporate decision-making.
The foundation of shareholder value lies in the emergence of financial-
economic theories in the early 1980s, which in turn stemmed from the strong
neoliberal consensus that occurred in the same period, chiefly in the United
Kingdom and the United States.79 In the context of corporate governance, this
translated into the development of “contractarian” theories of the firm by law
and economics scholars, who identified the company as a nexus of contracts
among different constituencies, with shareholders recognized as owners and
residual claimants.80 This economics-centric approach advanced the concept
of economic efficiency which in turn justified the corporate goal of
maximizing returns for shareholders as the best possible allocation of
resources.81
It is worth repeating that the prioritization of shareholders ahead of other
stakeholders became more critical in the last twenty years due to the
increasing influence of capital markets on corporate strategies.82 Deep and
liquid stock markets were relied upon as sources of information in regard to
the value of stock83 and as monitoring mechanisms.84 This was exemplified
more typically by the employment of stock options and other forms of
market-based compensations which were envisaged as an ideal tool to align
the interest of management and shareholders.85
The assumptions that justified the application of shareholder value have
however, become unpopular in recent years. The corporate scandals that
occurred during the last decade and the GFC contributed greater strength to
the critics of shareholder value.86 This section lays out some of the arguments
brought against the shareholder value paradigm.
The first strong argument made by legal scholars is that the economic
conception of shareholders’ ownership is misguided. It overlooks the fact that
by law, shareholders are merely owners of the shares they hold and not of the
79. See PARKINSON, supra note 11, at ch. 4.
80. FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 36–39 (First Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed., 1991).
81. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32–33.
82. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Financialism: A (Very) Brief History, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 323
(2010).
83. See Marc T. Moore & Antoine Reberioux, Revitalizing the Institutional Roots of Anglo-
American Corporate Governance, 40 ECON. & SOC’Y 84, 88–89 (2011).
84. EASTERBROOK& FISCHEL, supra note 80 (Financial markets were seen as a way to counter
“managerialism.”).
85. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview
of the Issues, 20 ACAD. OFMGMT. PERSP. 8 (Feb. 2006).
86. See Andrew Keay, Shareholder Primacy in Corporate Law: Can It Survive? Should It
Survive?, 7 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 369 (2010); STOUT, supra note 14; MITCHELL, supra
note 16; Paddy W. Ireland, Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership, 62 MOD. L.
REV. 32 (1999).
256 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 12
company.87 This entails that rights and expectations are limited by law to
what flows from their shares (typically a right to vote, and receive dividends)
and this automatically defies the rhetoric of ownership that has essentially
redefined the property rights of one constituency in the corporation.88
Similarly, the identification of shareholders as residual claimants has
been strongly refuted. The rationale for the assumption was that unlike other
constituencies who have a right to a fixed claim (such as employees,
managers, creditors) shareholders rely on whatever remains after the
company has paid its fixed claims.89 Law and economics scholarship argued
that shareholders, as ultimate risk-bearers, have the greatest stake in the
company and should benefit from it being run for the purpose of maximizing
the value of stock.90 This construction however, is based on an incorrect
proposition because, as pointed out by Lynn Stout, shareholders are treated
by corporate law as residual claimants only when the company is insolvent.91
Outside insolvency, shareholders are entitled by corporate law mechanisms
to receive payments only if the company has retained sufficient profits, and
if the board declares dividends to be paid.92
Together with the above two points, shareholder value rests on another
assumption that derives from the economic—rather than legal—
configuration of the company, namely the principal-agent model. This is
closely linked to the contractarian view of the company advocated by
Michael Jensen and William Meckling in the late 1970s and then
consolidated in more recent scholarship.93 The principal-agent model has,
87. STOUT, supra note 14, at 37; Ireland, supra note 86, at 32–33. This legal stance also draws
on the legal definition of shares provided by courts in England. See Short v. Treasury Comm’rs
[1948] 1 KB 116.
88. Margaret M. Blair, Shareholder Value, Corporate Governance, and Corporate
Performance, A Post-Enron Reassessment of the Conventional Wisdom, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL FLAWS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 53, 57 (Peter K. Cornelius & Bruce
Kogut eds., 2003).
89. EASTERBROOK& FISCHEL, supra note 80, at 36. The authors suggested that in most firms,
the risk-bearers will have an expectation (or they will have contracted) for a promise to see the value
of their stock maximized. Unlike other participants in the firm, who will have contracted for fixed
claims, risk-bearers receive a residual claim to the firm’s profits. The authors went on to emphasize
how this configuration of fixed and variable claims would serve an economic function. See id.
90. Id. at 37. The assertion by Easterbrook and Fischel here is grounded in the belief that
investment by shareholders is based on a promise to maximize the value of stock. If that promise is
not maintained, it will be difficult to raise new money, because prospective investors would not
trust the promise to maximize shareholder value. This, in turn, would lead to undesirable
consequences in the economy because the general level of investments would collapse.
91. STOUT, supra note 14, at 40 (observing that outside bankruptcy, it is wrong to suggest that
shareholders are entitled to whatever is left once the company’s obligations are paid).
92. Id. This leads to concluding that shareholders are just one of several groups that can be
described as residual claimants, in the sense that they can enjoy benefits beyond those provided in
their explicit contracts.
93. SeeMichael C. Jensen &William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. OF FIN. ECON. 305, 310–12 (1976); EASTERBROOK&
FISCHEL, supra note 80, at 36–39; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 439.
2018] The Corporate Law Dilemma 257
however, been strongly criticized for failing to capture the essence of large
public firms. The structure of these entities is based on many fractional
shareholders and different organizational layers of management, which go
clearly beyond the simplification proposed by the principal-agent model.94
One of the presumed advantages associated with the shareholder model
is the direct accountability that it creates, because shareholders would be
motivated to monitor the board. This assertion has become contentious for
two reasons. Firstly, because the degree of accountability is not evident in
large public corporations, where the effective powers of shareholders to
control the board and shape its decision-making is not substantial enough.95
Secondly, it is observed that shareholders are not a monolithic category, as
they encompass different categories and types of investors. Beyond having
different preferences and interests in the company, their involvement in the
company’s affairs will also vary.96
Much of the criticism against shareholder value in the last ten years has
revolved around the increased interplay of corporations with financial
markets. In particular, the belief that share prices are a reliable measure of
the value of the company has been contradicted. While deep and liquid stock
markets do respond quickly to new information, it has become evident that
share prices deviate substantially from their value through periods of boom
and bust.97 This has a number of explanations, primarily identified with the
complexity of financial information that is transmitted to the market and the
difficulty to process it correctly.98 Behavioral explanations are also put
forward because markets tend to overreact, leading to investors’ herding
behavior and other socio-pathological phenomena. This translates into stock
prices going out of line, moving upward or downward, regardless of the
fundamentals.99More generally, share price can be misrepresented by market
or industry fluctuations which do not necessarily reflect the real value of the
company.100
94. STOUT, supra note 14, at 36.
95. See Andrew Keay, Company Directors Behaving Poorly: Disciplinary Options for
Shareholders, J. OF BUS. L. 656 (2007) (arguing that shareholders’ powers vary and are more
effective in the United Kingdom than in the United States, but still, they do not amount to a reliable
accountability mechanism to hold directors responsible if they fail to maximize share value).
96. See Keay, Ascertaining the Corporate Objective, supra note 3, at 672.
97. See Lynn A. Stout, Stock Prices and Social Wealth 10, 21 (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Law
& Economics Research Paper No. 24,9991, 2000).
98. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH.
UNIV. L. REV. 2 (2009).
99. Blair, supra note 88, at 59; Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis, Behavioural
Finance and Financial Regulation: In Search of a New Orthodoxy, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 23, 33
(2009). Avgouleas explains that investors’ herding behavior (as well as other forms of cognitive
bias, such as overconfidence) is what also contributes to (or directly causes) irrational price changes.
100. See Thomas Clarke, Accounting for Enron: Shareholder Value and Stakeholder Interests,
13 CORP. GOVERNANCE 598, 598 (2005).
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In essence, share price has been tainted as an unreliable index of
corporate success. This became evident after Enron, which showed how
manipulated and misleading information could be released into the market.
The pressure to maximize shareholders’ wealth led executives to pursue
short-term strategies finalized at inflating the company’s share value, mainly
through accounting manipulations or complex off-balance sheet
transactions.101 In other words, pursuing the quarterly growth of share price
became the main goal of management, regardless of the company’s
fundamentals.
This problem was accentuated by the application of stock options,
employed as corollaries of shareholder value to guarantee a strong link
between firm’s performance and managers’ remuneration, whose interests
would remain aligned with shareholders.102 The main problem of stock
options is the incentive they create to pursue risky strategies. This is due to
the intrinsic moral hazard they involve, because option-holders win big if the
option goes up but are not penalized if the stock price plunges.103
Shareholders’ limited liability allows benefiting from high risks and high
levels of leverage because they can reap the gains of the investment, while
the underlying risks are borne by other stakeholders.104 In highly-leveraged
financial institutions in particular, the opportunity for rapid expansion of
financial assets and short-term returns on equity has led to excessive risk-
taking.105 Stock options have exacerbated executives’ incentives to speculate
through risky transactions because the more valuable the options, the more
risky the underlying investment.106
The criticism toward executives’ pay is often associated with more
general concerns over the suitability of market mechanisms to control
managerial behavior and direct decision-making toward the long-term
interest of the company. Much scholarship has been dedicated to clarifying
whether the market for corporate control (in the shape of hostile takeovers)
could represent a valid corporate governance tool. While no conclusive
101. William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275
(2002).
102. See Blair & Stout, supra note 22, at 249 (for an understanding of the relationship and
dynamics between different corporate constituencies). Executive compensation, such as stock
options, was conceived as a mechanism to align the interests of shareholders and management,
mitigating thus the agency problem that is typical of widely-held corporations. Conventional
wisdom since the 1980s has advocated the application of these equity-based incentives, which
would spur executives toward the goal of achieving increases in share value. See Simone M. Sepe,
Making Sense of Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J. OFCORP. L. 189, 203–04 (2014).
103. Stuart L. Gillan,Option-Based Compensation: Panacea or Pandora’s Box, 14 J.OFAPPLIED
CORP. FIN. 116 (2001).
104. Sepe, supra note 102, at 204, 217.
105. Emilios Avgouleas & Jay Cullen, Excessive Leverage and Bankers’ Pay: Governance and
Financial Stability Costs of a Symbiotic Relationship, 20 COLUM. J. OF EUR. L. 1, 7–9 (2015).
106. On the distorting effect of leverage, see generally Margaret Blair, Financial Innovation,
Leverage, Bubbles and the Distribution of Income, 30 REV. BANKING& FIN. L. 225 (2010).
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evidence has been produced in this sense,107 shareholder value proponents
supported the assumption that the threat of takeovers would constitute a
sufficient discipline mechanism on the board and that liability rules and
statutory mechanisms would be superfluous.108 Against this proposition, it
has been argued that hostile takeovers often have detrimental effects on
employees and other stakeholders,109 and they exacerbate short-termism
when executives engage in “empire-building” strategies,110 something that
was feared in the context of the recent AstraZeneca’s attempted takeover.
Despite providing an allocative function of corporate resources, hostile
takeovers’ role as a corporate governance mechanism has been largely
redefined as a residual one, whereas other internal tools should provide the
necessary control of managerial decision-making.111
C. A CRITIQUE OF STAKEHOLDER THEORY
The stakeholder theory originated from social-democratic ethos that were
developed in the post-war years and were later channeled into a
communitarian philosophy. This envisaged a more inclusive and
multidimensional approach to corporate law.112 The ideology was more
clearly defined in the 1980s when the concept of stakeholder was integrated
within organizational behavior studies.113 It posited that beyond
shareholders, other constituencies contribute to the corporation and their
interests too deserve consideration, particularly because they are often not
covered by contractual provisions.114
Traditionally, German corporate law epitomizes a typical stakeholder
approach with its codetermination system. This grants employees certain
powers in the management of the company by allowing employees’
representatives to sit on the supervisory board.115 In essence, the fundamental
107. See B. Clarke, Where Was the ‘Market for Corporate Control’ When We Needed It?, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
75 (W. Sun, J. Stewart et al. eds., 2011); PARKINSON, supra note 11, at 113.
108. PARKINSON, supra note 11, at 132–34. It was suggested that the effect of implementing legal
regulation on top of what is already provided by the market would be an inefficient distortion of
managerial behavior.
109. Deakin, supra note 36, at 15–16.
110. See generally Ajit Singh, Take-overs, Economic Natural Selection, and the Theory of the
Firm: Evidence from the Postwar United Kingdom Experience, 85 ECON. J. 497, 497–515 (1975).
111. John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of
the Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1221 (1984).
112. JOHNGRAY, FALSEDAWN: THEDELUSIONS OFGLOBAL CAPITALISM 94 (1999).
113. See generally R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER
APPROACH (1984).
114. Id. at 97. The argument was that the board has a duty to create value for all the actors who
are affected by the company’s decision-making.
115. See generally Mark J. Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities Markets, 5
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 199 (1999); see also ANDREAS CAHN & DAVID C. DONALD, COMPARATIVE
COMPANY LAW 315, 445 (2010).
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feature of stakeholder theory consists of having boards that undertake the
function of balancing the interests of different constituencies.
The pluralistic foundation of stakeholder theory has been often pointed
at as its main problem. This line of criticism became recurrent in the 1990s
in connection with the stagnation of social-democratic economies in
continental Europe.116 It was then suggested that the theory could lead to
inefficiency because it did not provide guidelines as to how the board should
balance different (possibly conflicting) interests and it did not even define
the concept of stakeholder, therefore leaving a problem of subjectivity in the
identification of these interests.117 The enforceability of stakeholders’ rights
was also seen as a problem because courts would find it problematic to
interfere with subjective boards’ policies, trying to impose objective
standards.118 The enforceability of stakeholders’ rights is further hindered by
the procedural barriers that in most legal systems do not permit all
stakeholders to initiate derivative actions.119
Another problem associated with the stakeholder theory is the lack of
standards to evaluate corporate performances. Departing in fact from
shareholder value entails that share price is not relied on as the main metric
of corporate success. The absence of equivalent stakeholder standards upon
which the management can be evaluated leaves an accountability gap,
because under the theory there is no specific constituency that can hold the
board accountable. From a different perspective, it would be unlikely that any
group will perform an efficient monitoring function on the board for fear of
other groups’ free-riding.120
The above arguments have led to strong criticism on the competitiveness
of corporations organized under the stakeholder model. The underlying
objection is that departing from shareholder primacy would affect firms’
ability to maximize their value because of the impossibility to balance
conflicting claims and operate beyond a mono-dimensional (shareholder)
goal.121 Shareholder value proponents argued that this dilemma would be
most clearly reflected in the context of takeover bids where the interest of
116. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 451.
117. Elaine Sternberg, The Defects of Stakeholder Theory, 5 CORP. GOVERNANCE 1, 4–5 (1997).
118. Sarah Kiarie, At Crossroads: Shareholder Value, Stakeholder Value and Enlightened
Shareholder Value: Which Road Should the United Kingdom Take?, 17 INT’L COMPANY & COM.
L. REV. 329, 333– 334 (2006).
119. Keay, Ascertaining the Corporate Objective, supra note 3, at 676. In the United Kingdom,
for instance, only shareholders on behalf of the company are allowed to bring a derivative claim.
Keay observes that unless they are also members of other stake-holding groups, they will be
reluctant to bring an action that will entail costs. Id.
120. Jeswald W. Salacuse, Corporate Governance in the New Century, 25 COMPANY LAW. 69,
75 (2004).
121. Jensen, supra note 15, at 300.
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employees is likely to conflict with shareholders and may induce directors to
frustrating bids.122
This last critique carries also a normative dimension. Stakeholder theory
would inevitably broaden the narrow framework that has so far characterized
the mainstreamAnglo-American approach to corporate law, because it would
encompass and directly regulate the social costs created by the company
(currently dealt with by external regulation or market mechanisms).123
Moreover, this approach would be less competitive according to shareholder
value proponents because of its less facilitative normative framework.
D. WHY ANEWMODEL?
Much of the critique laid out in the previous sections is supported by
corporate scandals that occurred throughout the last fifteen years. In
particular, corporate and financial failures have coincided with the
breakdown of shareholder value mechanisms: this was true for the Enron-
type scandals, for the failures of financial institutions in the United Kingdom
and in the United States during the GFC, and for the environmental disasters
epitomized by the BP oil spill.124 The corporate governance dimension of
these failures can be identified, inter alia, with flawed systems of decision-
making. In particular, risk-management and control functions were not
adequately conducted by boards whose priorities remained geared toward the
increase of share value125 to the detriment of long-term objectives.126 This
approach to corporate management resulted in the failure to take account of
different societal interests that were heavily affected by corporate behaviors.
A more specific manifestation of this unfair societal arrangement is
provided by recent events in the financial and environmental industries,
which have been illustrated earlier in this Article with the cases of BP and
RBS. Admittedly, the failure of shareholder value to provide a valid model
of corporate management became evident in the early 2000s with the wave
of “accounting frauds” epitomized by Enron. In the context of financial
institutions, the centrality of shareholder value has become even more
122. See Kiarie, supra note 118, at 337; see generally THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND
MERGERS, THE TAKEOVER CODE (2016).
123. Johnston, supra note 21, at 65.
124. See generally Bratton, supra note 101 (with specific reference to the Enron failure); STOUT,
supra note 14 (for a broad and strong critique of shareholder value); Cherry & Sneirson, supra note
27, at 983 (for an account of the BP oil spill and the corporate governance failures therein); Bavoso,
supra note 23, at 91.
125. The aim to increase share price in the short-term often underscores empire-building
strategies. A topical example is the acquisition of ABN-Amro by Royal Bank of Scotland in 2007,
which eventually had disastrous effects on the UK bank that needed public bailout in 2008.
126. See RICHARD POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM 80 (2009) (explaining that risk
managers’ activity is not conducive to profit-making and therefore, is often overlooked by the
board).
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contested.127 This was recently confirmed by an EU Green Paper that
acknowledged a number of problems in the governance of financial
institutions.128 It noted that a presumption of effective shareholder control in
financial institutions is misguided because shareholders will be concerned
with short-term financial goals instead of the entity’s long-term viability.129
However, this view has not translated in substantial reforms or shifts in
policy directions. On the contrary, despite much criticism (particularly within
academic circles130) shareholder value has remained the widely accepted
criterion of corporate decision-making131 and policy responses to the GFC
have not departed from a shareholder-centric agenda.132 This tendency shows
that, notwithstanding the lessons drawn from recent events, the neoclassical
theories advancing shareholder supremacy are still very central to policy-
making and law reforms in the area of corporate law.133 In the United
Kingdom, both the Stewardship Code of 2012 and the Corporate Governance
Code of 2016 promoted wider shareholder participation in corporate
governance. The former followed the recommendation of the Walker
Review134 and set out monitoring responsibilities on shareholders, and
recommendations for institutional investors to act collectively to that end and
on voting policies.135 The Corporate Governance Code also promoted
enhanced shareholder power specifically with regard to pay-setting
procedures.136
127. See Daniel Ferreira et al., Measuring Management Insulation from Shareholder Pressure
(LSE Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 01/2016, 2016) (The authors show that banks where
management is more insulated from shareholders were less likely to need bailouts.).
128. See generally Commission Green Paper on Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions
and Remuneration Policies COM (2010) 284 final (June 2, 2010).
129. Id. at 8 (The report specified that this attitude reflected shareholders’ excessive risk-taking
which is in turn encouraged by performance-related incentives for managers.).
130. This emerges from a number of initiatives, which includes the Sustainable Companies
Project, promoted by Professor Beate Sjafjell at Oslo University. See The Sustainable Companies
Project, U. OFOSLO, DEP’T OF PRIV. L., https://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/english/research/projects/sustai
nable-companies/ (last modified Mar. 14, 2016).
131. Bavoso, supra note 14.
132. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE (2012). In the United Kingdom,
this is exemplified by the UK Corporate Governance Code (2016) and by the Stewardship Code
(2012), while in the European Union, similar views emerged from the EU Commission Green Paper
The EU Corporate Governance Framework. See Commission Green Paper on The EU Corporate
Governance Framework COM (2011) 164 final (Apr. 5, 2011). These Codes, as well as the EU
Framework, have maintained a strong shareholder value approach to corporate governance,
identifying shareholders as key components in the governance of large corporations and advocating
their further empowerment, especially insofar as monitor and control functions are concerned.
133. See Lorraine Talbot, Why Shareholders Shouldn’t Vote: A Marxist-Progressive Critique of
Shareholder Empowerment, 76 MOD. L. REV. 791, 809–10 (2013).
134. See DAVIDWALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND OTHER
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES (2009).
135. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 132.
136. Id. Section D of the Corporate Governance Code sets out best practices with regards to
remuneration. In doing so, it states that shareholders should specifically approve remuneration
schemes or significant changes to them. Id.
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As noted earlier, this approach is misguided in the context of large public
corporations. It has been observed that fragmented ownership and foreign
investments are not conducive to shareholders’ enhanced participation137
because the interest of this type of shareholder is largely geared to short-term
quarterly gains,138 and active engagement in corporate governance represents
costs that would reap economic benefits only in the longer term. This
assertion is confirmed by shareholders’ votes in 300 annual general meetings
in 2012 where, on average, votes against remuneration reports reached only
7.64%.139
One of the reasons for the resilience of shareholder value over the last
fifteen years is the absence of an alternative model, given the mistrust in the
United States and the United Kingdom, for stakeholder-based theories which
are regarded as fundamentally impractical.140 The flaws associated with
shareholder-based decision-making processes, however, can no longer be
neglected. Placing one constituency at the center of very complex and
multidimensional organizations has proven unjustified141 and socially
destabilizing. The corporate governance failures, of which mention has been
made, have created externalities on a number of constituencies whose
interests were not adequately considered by BoDs, notably: employees,
taxpayers, consumers, local communities, and the environment.
Notwithstanding the potential harm to large sections of society, complex
risks (such as environmental or financial) in large public firms were
consistently understated by executives who were kept myopically focused,
due to perverse market incentives, on the pursuit of short-term goals.
The question as to why risks were not properly gauged is a complex one.
Assessing and managing risks is among the most critical aspects of the
decision-making process of large public firms. While this delicate process
has resulted in unsatisfactory outcomes, it needs to be explained that in many
circumstances, warning signs were raised by risk-managers within firms.
Richard Posner has argued that BoDs driven by shareholder value goals are
more likely to ignore red flags, chiefly because the function of risk-managers
is not aligned with the overarching profit-making objective.142 On the other
hand, boards tend to rationally follow traders who pursue short-term profits
driven by market-based incentives.143
The way in which risks have been underestimated in large public firms
can also be explained through the mechanics of risk perception in boards.
137. See Brian Cheffins, The Stewardship Code’s Achilles’ Heel, 73 MOD. L. REV. 1004, 1024
(2010).
138. Keay, The Global Financial Crisis, supra note 55, at 11.
139. Talbot, supra note 133, at 814.
140. See Keay, Ascertaining the Corporate Objective, supra note 3, at 679.
141. It is worth reiterating that the law does not mandate so in both the United Kingdom and the
United States. See STOUT, supra note 14; Bavoso, supra note 14.
142. POSNER, supra note 126, at 80.
143. Id.
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Behavioral studies have examined how psychological and cultural forces
alter risk perception in large firms and thus affect decision-making. Donald
Langevoort has observed that overconfidence in periods of boom leads to
persistence, effort, and enhanced risk-taking, which will outperform more
realistic and cautious strategies.144 Overconfidence, especially in times of
boom, becomes embedded in the corporate culture and will result in common
bias in the organization, which also risks affecting the perception of those
who conduct external assessments.145 It is correct to say that the way risk is
perceived within an organization becomes institutionalized because of
psychological and cultural forces that will make individuals believe that there
is no risk big enough to worry about.146 In the context of decision-making
processes, overconfidence toward risk can become a self-fulfilling prophecy
in times of good fortune. It is also true that overconfidence before the crisis
was fueled by the availability of risk modeling and risk mitigation techniques
that further affected individuals’ cognitive bias and led to institutional
underestimation of risk.147
Boards’ decision-making was also driven by investors’ expectations.
Keeping the stock price inflated required firms to keep “dancing,”148 because
this form of behavior was deemed functional to maintain a competitive edge
over other firms (especially in the financial sector) and satisfy investors’
demands for quarterly gains.149 This suggests that beyond the behavioral
explanation of investors’ irrational exuberance, stock prices were
fundamentally mispriced because firms failed to disclose information to
allow the accurate assessment of risk.150 In other words, if share price remains
the metric for corporate management, the distorted reactions of the stock
market will likely produce biased behavior among investors and affect
decision-making at board level.151
144. Donald Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to
the Psychology, Culture and Ethics of Financial Risk-Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209, 1221
(2011); see generally GEORGEA. AKERLOF&ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOWHUMAN
PSYCHOLOGYDIVES THE ECONOMY 11–18, 86 (2009).
145. Langevoort, supra note 144, at 1220–23 (The inside bias will influence non-executive
directors and also gatekeepers because they will tend to believe in the inaccurate disclosure
produced by those who have inside knowledge.).
146. Id. at 1242. The institutionalized perception therefore overrides the individual one and defies
the assumption that managers act rationally.
147. Id. at 1221. Posner, however, argued that excessive risk-taking was primarily due to wrong
incentives and moral hazard rather than psychological factors. See POSNER, supra note 126, at 80.
148. This term is borrowed from the sentence used by Citigroup CEO Chuck Prince, who stated
at the outset of the 2008 crisis that “you’ve got to get up and keep dancing.” This refers to strategies
at firm level that would positively affect the stock price, hence the wilder the dancing, the higher
the stock price. See Citigroup’s Chuck Prince Wants to Keep Dancing, and Can You Really Blame
Him?, TIME (July 10, 2007), http://business.time.com/2007/07/10/citigroups_chuck_prince_wants/.
149. Langevoort, supra note 144, at 1231.
150. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 654 (2010).
151. Langevoort, supra note 144, at 1233.
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The brief behavioral explanations of corporate decision-making show
that risk-management functions have been hindered by cultural and
organizational factors. This means that the cognitive dimension of this
fundamental function has been dominated by profitability instead of an
objective assessment of risks.
A final note needs to stress that the Anglo-American shareholder-centric
model of corporate governance has relied since the 1980s on non-executive
directors (NED) to bring an independent outside perspective to the
company’s decision-making. The collapse of financial institutions during the
GFC unveiled, however, a systematic failure of banks’ financial strategies.
This included general breakdowns in the duties of executives but more
importantly in the risk-management function performed by NEDs who were
not able to scrutinize the transactions entered into by banks and their
increasing level of leverage.152
One problem associated with NEDs is that they tend to lack industry or
firm-specific expertise because of the “outside” position they have in the
company. It has also been observed that their primary function in public
corporation is to manage the stock price and its maximization in the short
term, which effectively makes them guardian of shareholders’ interests.153 It
may be further noted in this sense that NEDs’ independence is particularly
valued for their ability to relate to inputs by securities analysts and
institutional investors in regard to the optimal firm’s capital allocation.
NEDs’ full inception in the United States in the 1980s corroborates the above
explanation, given that the 1980s were characterized by the increase in debt
finance and leveraged buyouts and the employment of off-balance sheet
financing.154
The dilemma related to NEDs’ independence is that while their objective
and detached perspective is necessary to balance CEO’s and executives’ bias,
this function equally depends on a certain degree of knowledge of the
company’s strategies and culture, which, however, risks defying NEDs’
independence.155 As noted by Marc Moore, this tension between
independence and expertise has clearly shifted over the last ten years, with
the former prevailing in the 2000s and the latter in the post GFC period.156
As these requirements can hardly coexist in NEDs, this may result in more
specialized boards in industries that involve complex products and/or an
element of public concern (such as financial services or utilities), while
152. See generally Roman A. Tomasic, Corporate Rescue, Governance and Risk Taking in
Northern Rock (Part 1), 29 COMPANY LAW. 297 (2008).
153. See generally Marc T. Moore, The Evolving Contours of the Board’s Risk Management
Function in UK Corporate Governance, 10 J. CORP. L. STUD. 279, 305–06 (2010).
154. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1520–23 (2007).
155. Moore, supra note 153, at 305–06; WALKER, supra note 134, at para. 3.7; Wolf-Georg
Ringe, Independent Directors: After the Crisis, 14 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 401, 415 (2013).
156. Moore, supra note 153, at 306.
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independence may prevail in contexts where the main corporate governance
concern remains the conflicts of interests at the board level.157
More general criticism has pointed to the lack of incentives for NEDs to
provide objective assessments. This has a twofold explanation. Firstly, the
same behavioral explanations apply to NEDs who are acquiescent to market
conditions in times of boom.158 Secondly, agency problems extend to
independent directors too, and this translates in dangers of “groupthink”
between executives and independent directors with the same industry
background.159 In essence, the natural solution to this problem would be to
bring ex ante an expert outside perspective to work inside the firm. The next
section will illustrate how this could be realized.
III. THE ENLIGHTENED SOVEREIGN CONTROL PARADIGM AS
A NEWMODEL OF CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING
A. THECONCEPT OF ESC
The arguments laid out in the previous section expose the urgency to find
a new model to govern decision-making processes in large public firms and
provide legal certainty to the question of the corporate objective. To address
this problem, this Article puts forward the ESC paradigm as an alternative to
shareholder value and stakeholder theory.
The concept of ESC is derived from a number of theories that need to be
briefly highlighted in this section. The work conducted by Mitchell
emphasized the nature of corporations as “externalising machines.”160 He
observed that while at the individual level, decisions have an impact on the
decision-maker who will often directly feel the effect of its consequences and
hence will have moral constraints, the result of the same process within a
corporation is depersonalized because of limited liability and the
interposition of the corporate vehicle between decision-makers and those
affected by the decision.161 The corporate structure also allows externalizing
costs related to corporate profit-making activities onto other groups who are
affected by the corporation but have no powers to shape its behavior. Mitchell
argues that as artificial legal entities, corporations lack the framework that
allows a moral perspective of the choice, and thus they are naturally led
157. Id. at 34.
158. See Langevoort, supra note 144, at 1233 (arguing that NEDs lack motivation and interest in
objectivity because they also prioritize profitability over caution in times of growth, when market
mechanisms become legitimate).
159. WALKER, supra note 134, at para. 2.17. For a specific overview of the question of cognitive
boundaries and groupthink at board level, see generally Emilios Avgouleas & Jay Cullen, Market
Discipline and EU Corporate Governance Reform in the Banking Sector: Merits, Fallacies, and
Cognitive Boundaries, 41 J. OF L. & SOC’Y 28 (2014).
160. MITCHELL, supra note 16, at 49.
161. Id. at 40–43.
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toward behaviors that are irresponsible and unaccountable. This contributes
to creating a more unequal society.162
This line of critique leads to questioning limited liability and its
conceptual foundations. In particular, this has involved the reprisal of the old
concession company law theory, first developed in the Victorian Age. The
theory viewed limited liability as a concession concurred by the state, flowing
into the right of incorporation.163 While under this construction the company
was seen as a right granted by the state and thus derived from its power,
contemporary scholarship has revisited the theory in a more socialized form.
Professor Dine has argued that modern corporations are actually derived from
society because they benefit from the cooperation and interplay of several
social groups.164 This implies a bottom-up concession theorywhereby society
represents the foundation of corporations, and communities would have the
power to influence corporate decision-making.165 This line of thinking entails
that companies would not only be derived from society, but they would be
responsible to a democratically represented community.166
In this sense, a strong pluralist approach has been developed by Gunther
Teubner who expanded the gist of the traditional stakeholder concept. He
regarded corporations as entities that should advance the privileges of both
internal (shareholders or employees) and external groups (such as
communities and the environment). The board would therefore be called to
embrace a more holistic approach to management.167 Teubner’s proposition
rests on the hypothesis that a corporation does not only exist as a self-serving
and self-realizing entity, but it has to fulfill a broader social role. In order to
achieve this, the organizational structure of the corporation and the way it is
managed should be shaped to reflect the interest of society.168 This entails a
different determination of the corporate objective because different social
groups would become relevant insofar as they represent social interests and
are in a position to control fiduciary duties.169 An ensuing and more complex
162. Id. at 43–44 (observing that this is so because decision-makers in the company take the shape
of the company and are absorbed by the corporate culture).
163. The idea of limited liability as a right concurred by the state brings back the restrictions of
the Bubble Act of 1720, which prohibited joint stock concerns for commercial purposes. See
Andrew H. Miller, Subjectivity Ltd: The Discourse of Liability in the Joint Stock Companies Act of
1856 and Gaskell’s Cranford, 61 ELH 139, 146 (1994).
164. See JANETDINE, THEGOVERNANCE OFCORPORATEGROUPS ch. 4 (2000).
165. See id. at 124. The structure would be from the bottom, because there would not be in this
case a monarch or a sovereign giving the concession; rather, it would come from society.
166. Paddy Ireland, Property and Contract in Contemporary Corporate Theory, 23 LEGALSTUD.
453, 506 (2003).
167. Gunther Teubner, Corporate Fiduciary Duties and their Beneficiaries: A Functional
Approach to the Legal Institutionalization of Corporate Responsibility, in KLAUS J. HOPT &
GUNTHER TEUBNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS’ LIABILITIES: LEGAL,
ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICALANALYSES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 157 (1987).
168. Id. at 157.
169. Id. at 165–67. This may entail a process of “proceduralization” of fiduciary duties directed
at the creation of organizational structures that allow the optimal balancing of corporate
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configuration of corporate relationships would address problems of
accountability, explored earlier in this Article, because all those who have
interests in the company would be represented in the decision-making
process. According to Eric Orts, corporate law theory should depart from the
simplifications dictated by economic policy, and the resulting legal
framework should take account of the technical and normative complexities
that underpin the varieties of corporate relationships. Orts argues that more
detailed rules on corporate behavior can provide social benefit
notwithstanding the increase in legal complexity, because they would create
the right balance between positive freedoms and negative constraints that
would adequately structure corporate power.170 Ultimately, corporate law
should provide legal and political legitimacy in the context of board decision-
making, but this has been difficult to achieve. As observed by Orts in 1993,
policy-making in the sphere of corporate law is anchored to economic
efficiency discourse, which in turns dominates discussions about
legitimacy.171
The ESC is proposed as an alternative model of corporate management
and embraces the motives of the above theories to the extent that they offer
greater recognition of social priorities vis-à-vis economic ones. It generates
from the overarching belief that social and welfare interests should be
embedded among the goals of those corporations whose activities impact a
wide range of constituencies. However, the ESC recognizes the importance
of public firms for the creation of social wealth, and therefore looks at
measures that would not curtail entrepreneurship. The ultimate need to
combine economic interests and social concerns pushes toward a balanced
(indeed enlightened) intervention of the state (hence the use of the word
sovereign) as guardian of social interests (which implies control).
The characteristic feature of the ESC is represented by the involvement
of the state in balancing the different interests at stake in large public
corporations and therefore in shaping their corporate objective. Unlike other
stakeholder-oriented propositions that advocated a similar redirection of
corporate actions toward more inclusive goals, the ESC is unique in the way
it seeks to rebalance this fundamental function. This procedural mechanism
will be explained in the next section, but it is worth clarifying at this stage
that decision-making processes in large public corporations would be shaped
by the different composition of their BoDs, which would be complemented
by the direct inclusion of state professionals.
performance and function, taking into account at the same time the interest of the non-economic
environment.
170. Orts, supra note 64, at 1597.
171. Id. at 1595. Orts argues that while economic efficiency has driven all legitimacy arguments,
a normative justification that would be reflected in legal rules and processes is also needed. These
would provide legitimacy to corporate power. Id.
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Moreover, while the rationale behind the ESC is aligned with other
pluralistic theories, it differentiates for two main reasons. Firstly, in line with
its aims, the ESC is conceived as a more multidimensional approach than
traditional stakeholder theories. Much of the scholarship on stakeholder
theory has concentrated on the impaired nature of stakeholders’ rights in the
company, which are outside the principal-agent umbrella and are not
sufficiently covered by contractual provisions.172 It was also mentioned
earlier in this Article that traditionally, the German codetermination system
has epitomized the stakeholder approach to corporate decision-making.
While rebalancing the relationship between shareholders and labor, this
approach fails to appreciate the importance of other relevant stakeholders and
the centrality of the modern corporation in society, largely due to its interplay
with financial markets. Secondly, the ESC differs in the way in which the
balancing of different interests is pursued, and in particular because of the
proposed institutional design at the heart of the decision-making function.
The institutional framework is not only important to determine the
involvement of the state in BoD’s decision-making, but also to provide the
legitimization of corporate power that has been so far missing.173
The next section illustrates the institutional dimension of this proposal.
B. THE INSTITUTIONALDIMENSION
The ESC is cognizant of the natural tension between economic and social
interests and of the need to regulate corporate activities in a way that
promotes the former while protecting the latter. These conflicting concerns
pose a dilemma as to how corporations could be regulated in a way that is
both economically viable and socially sustainable in the long term. The way
in which this interest-weighing problem is addressed under the ESC is by
creating a two-tiered classification of corporations, each attracting a different
degree of state intervention.
State interference into what is predominantly perceived as the realm of
private ordering174 remains very unpopular, despite the regulatory failures
associated with market mechanisms in the pre-crisis years.175 This is so
largely because of the rhetoric flowing from regulatory theories developed in
the 1980s. Public and state forms of regulation became increasingly
problematic in that period due to the challenges posed by the globalized
172. FREEMAN, supra note 113, at 97.
173. The institutional framework of this proposal also differentiates it from other post-crisis
initiatives, such as the Irish experience with public interest directors appointed to credit institutions
involved in the banking crisis. For an overview of the Irish experience, see generally Blanaid Clarke
& Gail E. Henderson,Directors as Guardians of the Public Interest: Lessons from the Irish Banking
Crisis, 16 J. CORP. L. STUD. 187 (2016).
174. See generally Marc T. Moore, Private Ordering and Public Policy: The Paradoxical
Foundations of Corporate Contractarianism, 34 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 693 (2014).
175. POSNER, supra note 126, at 234–35.
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business community.176 It was then believed that independent, market-based
professionals would possess the necessary skills and expertise required by
the business environment, and that independence from political circles should
be achieved.177 From a regulatory perspective, this process resulted in the
reassignment of political powers to non-elected bodies (non-majoritarian
agencies), and it had the effect of creating an accountability and democratic
deficit.178 This, however, was considered a legitimate policy because of the
cost-effectiveness of the resulting arrangements, which would guarantee a
number of regulatory outcomes that were not thought to be possible with
democratically elected governments. Cost-effectiveness was justified
because of the expertise and independence (from government) of those who
were delegated.179 This line of reasoning contributed to redefining state
intervention as an uneconomic intrusion, conceived as a last resort
mechanism.180
The discussion on the democratic deficit of non-majoritarian regulatory
agencies has become particularly relevant in the context of corporate law
scholarship. Even though BoDs are not regulatory agencies, it is important to
remember that corporate decision-making in large public firms affects the
welfare of large sections of society. In essence, this can be regarded as an
assignment of quasi-political powers to private bodies (BoDs) who remain,
however, unaccountable to the stakeholders (but the shareholders181) who are
affected by their powers. Arguably, this results in a democratic deficit that
has led to the already announced problem of finding a legitimization of
corporate power in a democratic society.182
The above task has proven to be particularly difficult because the quasi-
regulating powers of the market and the related financial-economic theories
that were developed from the 1970s have advanced the pre-eminence of
176. See Giandomenico Majone, From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and
Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance, 17 J. OF PUB. POL’Y 139, 139 (1997).
177. Giandomenico Majone, The Regulatory State and its Legitimacy Problems, 22 WEST EUR.
POL. 1, 2 (1999) [hereinafter Majone, Legitimacy Problems] (referring in particular to the delegation
of regulatory powers to independent administrative authorities).
178. The democratic gap in particular is the result of the broken chain of political delegations.
See David Coen & Mark Thatcher, The New Governance of Markets and Non-Majoritarian
Regulators, 18 GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. POL’Y, ADMIN. & INSTITUTIONS 329, 330 (2005).
179. Majone, Legitimacy Problems, supra note 177, at 4.
180. Government intervention was considered a viable regulatory mechanism in the event of
market failure, because market failure would result in higher costs than those associated with
government intervention. See ANTHONY I. OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC
THEORY 30 (2004).
181. It can be argued that in contexts of dispersed ownership, shareholders’ power and incentive
to hold the board to account is limited too. See Richard A. Posner, From the New Institutional
Economics to Organization Economics: With Applications to Corporate Governance, Government
Agencies and Legal Institutions, 6 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 1, 11 (2010).
182. See PARKINSON, supra note 11, at ch. 1.
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firms’ economic interests.183 A broader concept of corporate law
encompassing wider socio-economic concerns has therefore been
understated.184 The ensuing narrow view of company law has hindered its
role in regulating a number of legal relationships that give rise, inter alia, to
social costs.185 While the decision-making process in such entities has had
effects on a broad range of social constituencies, it has remained anchored to
the interests of a very narrow section of society—the stockholders. The
model proposed in this Article therefore aims at filling this democratic deficit
by providing a legitimization of corporate decision-making for entities whose
activities impact society.
This Article in particular identifies BoDs of large public corporations as
the engines of corporate power. As discussed earlier in this section, they are
custodians of a very particular power, which is at odds with the very limited
accountability that they have. This Article argues that this power should be
brought within a democratic dimension, which would in turn provide society
with an indirect accountability link.186
Under the ESC, the state is envisaged as the natural custodian of different
societal interests because of its democratic underpinning, which places it in
a better position to attain regulatory goals in the public interest. However, it
needs to be clarified that the inclusion of a democratic-based social interest
in BoDs would be premised on the setting up of a permanent, state-based
institutional/regulatory body (the body).187 The institutional design, and the
related mechanisms of public accountability (illustrated later in this section),
will contribute in making the body a more effective tool to balance different
relevant interests that surface in BoD’s decision-making processes. In
particular, its institutional position and design would make the body
substantially different from the existing independent committees and from
other type of regulators, which in different ways have been traditionally
affected by problems of regulatory capture. The remainder of this section
focuses on the discussion of the organizational and institutional settings that
183. This has chiefly been the case through the application of “contractarian” theories of the firm
centered around the agency relationship between shareholders and directors, and the ensuing
efficiency rhetoric. It is also correct to say that the degree to which shareholder primacy and
economic efficiency have prevailed over stakeholder-oriented goals varied and took different shape
in the United Kingdom and the United States. See Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in
the “Anglo-American” Corporation, 50 VA. J. INT’LL. 579, 636 (2010);Marc T. Moore, supra note
174, at 699–701.
184. See Teubner, supra note 167.
185. Johnston, supra note 21, at 3. This exacerbated the democratic deficit described by
Parkinson and the lack of public legitimization of managerial power.
186. Majone, Legitimacy Problems, supra note 177, at 10, 13. Majone observed that lack of full
democratic link does not necessarily amount to lack of accountability, which could be supplemented
through institutional design. Id.
187. A more general discussion on this is conducted in VINCENZO BAVOSO, EXPLAINING
FINANCIAL SCANDALS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND THE
ENLIGHTENED SOVEREIGN CONTROL PARADIGM 236–75 (2013).
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would provide a degree of democratic accountability to corporate decision-
making through the operation of the proposed body.
It needs to be admitted that a degree of delegation is the necessary
compromise in modern regulatory processes.188 However, the consequential
lack of democracy can be mitigated through institutional arrangements that
regulate the relationship between the state and the regulatory body.189 Public
accountability190 could still be achieved via an appropriate institutional
design flowing into an arm’s-length relationship, whereby the regulatory
body is independent from government, or political control, and at the same
time its actions are consistent with the interests of the democratically elected
legislature.191 This could be achieved through procedural and substantive
constraints imposed on the regulatory body that would be required to issue
guidelines governing its discretion, and motivate its decisions. More
generally, a regime of public participation could also be seen as a viable
option.192 The ultimate aim of these institutional arrangements would be to
ensure that the proposed body is independent from political control insofar
as it is insulated from problems of “time limit” which are typically associated
with changes in government and political fluctuations; equally, the
democratic link would be preserved through accountability procedures that
would ensure consistency with broad social interests.
It is also necessary at this stage to submit that under the ESC, the
proposed public body is conceived as a new type of regulator, closer in its
institutional design to a professional body. This would address a number of
questions that arise in connection with the proposal, namely whether the
public body would be better at balancing conflicting interests and whether it
would escape the agency problems that typically characterize BoDs. With
respect to the first problem, professionals working in the proposed body
188. This is so because national political structures are not practicable outside of the political
sphere. This becomes particularly true when decisions have to be taken in complex or technical
contexts such as those that BoDs have to take in relation to environmental or financial matters. See
Renate Mayntz, Legitimacy and Compliance in Transnational Governance 9 (Max-Planck-Inst. for
the Study of Societies, Working Paper No. 10/5, 2010); Martin Lodge & Lindsay Stirton,
Accountability in the Regulatory State, in THEOXFORDHANDBOOKOFREGULATION 352, 354, 357
(Baldwin, Cave & Lodge eds., 2012).
189. Majone, Legitimacy Problems, supra note 177, at 8–10.
190. Accountability in this sense can be defined as the system whereby those who take decisions
can be held accountable by being answerable in front of a predetermined forum. See generallyMark
Bovens, Public Accountability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT (Ferlie,
Lynn & Pollitt eds. 2007); Mark Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual
Framework, 13 EUR. L. J. 447, 450 (2007).
191. Majone, Legitimacy Problems, supra note 177, at 11.
192. It has been observed that the intrinsic problem of accountability arising from the delegation
of regulatory powers rests on the dilemma of what degree of autonomy the delegated actors should
be given to perform their tasks, while ensuring an adequate level of control. See Colin Scott,
Accountability in the Regulatory State, 27 J. L. & SOC’Y 38, 39 (2000).
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would not be appointed from market players,193 nor would they be hired from
other public institutions.194 Instead, the proposed body would draw its
members from an ad hoc career path consisting of either a specifically
designed academy or a state exam that would qualify for the profession. In
both cases, professionals would receive the necessary training by a mix of
academics, regulators, and chartered practitioners (such as lawyers and
accountants). A predetermined career path would achieve the purpose of
equipping the professionals with the desired set of skills and knowledge, in
essence the expertise that BoDs were assumed to possess in order to
understand and balance conflicting interests.195 The result would be a
knowledge-based profession emphasizing the intellectual and independence
standards of its members. These would be closely linked to the cultural values
promoted within the proposed body. On the one hand, these values would
stem from the democratic and pluralist mission embedded in the body; on the
other, they would also derive from the intrinsic attributes and motivations of
those interested in this type of profession.196
With respect to the second problem, related to possible agency problems
afflicting the proposed body, a fundamental feature of this proposal is
represented by the compensation and the relating incentives that the
professionals would receive. Firstly, it is important to note that salaries to the
professionals would be paid by the body (hence by the state effectively)
instead of the company. This automatically shifts the question of agency
problems away from the company’s BoD.197 Secondly, the proposed body
would compensate its professionals with salaries that are not aligned to
market incentives (such as bonuses and stock options for instance).198 While
compensation schemes should be high enough to attract and retain talents, it
is contended that professionals, unlike company directors and executives,
193. This would avoid problems of “revolving doors,” which have become common and have
created undesired ties between financial institutions and regulators, with the former exerting
pressure on regulatory and policy outcomes. See LUCIANO GALLINO, FINANZCAPITALISMO 23–24
(2011).
194. This is the case, for instance, of the French regulator Autorite’ des Marches Financiers
(AMF). See The AMF, AUTORITÉ DES MARCHÉS FINANCIERS (July 8, 2013), http://www.amf-
france.org/en_US/L-AMF/Organisation/Gouvernance.
195. The professionals sitting on the board would not duplicate the set of skills and expertise that
the company already has. Board members (including NEDs), as well as executives, are not a
profession in fact, and they remain limited in their decision-making by the truncated rationality that
is typical of market actors. The professionals’ predetermined career path would, in this sense, serve
to intellectually educate them to balance the more traditional economic rationale underpinning
corporate decision-making with the long-term interests of different social groups affected by
corporate externalities.
196. Posner, supra note 181, at 23–24. Posner identifies the judiciary as a valid example in this
sense; academia could be another example. Id.
197. Similar agency-type problems may, in fact, arise in the context of the public body itself. A
discussion on this more specific problem is, however, beyond the scope of this present discussion.
198. Fixed salaries would more likely keep professionals averse to the high level of risk-taking
that has been induced by perverse market incentives like stock options.
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would remain unaffected by the incentives that determine the behavior of
most market actors. Instead, their main motivation would be to do their job
in a satisfactory way in order to attain consensus among their peers and
ultimately increase their professional reputation.199
C. THE TWO-TIERCLASSIFICATION
State intervention under the ESC is premised on a two-tier classification
of public corporations. The first tier is designed to comprise entities whose
activities can create externalities on society. This classification categorizes
firms beyond size, ownership structure or industry sector. While financial
firms, for instance, are today perceived as intrinsically dangerous for many
social groups due chiefly to the systemic importance they bear, other
corporate entities can equally cause harm to society because of the activities
they conduct.200According to the ESC, the social interest needs to be factored
into the regulation of these entities. More specifically, the type of supervision
and control over decision-making would guarantee that the social role of tier-
one corporations is fulfilled and that costs created by the entity are
internalized.
From a practical standpoint, the representation of the social, democratic-
based interest on BoDs would occur by drawing professionals from the
aforementioned institutional body to serve full-time on the board in a
capacity similar to that of non-executive directors. While serving on the
board, professionals would still be remunerated with public money by the
institutional body. Their professional background, as explained in the
previous section, would provide them with the necessary awareness of the
specific industry dynamics and of the related social and ethical issues. The
illustrated institutional setting would enhance the independent balancing of
different interests at stake in the decision-making process of tier-one firms
and avoid issues of groupthink. The hierarchical position of professionals in
the board would then implement a corporate objective aligned with the
multidimensional aspects of the business.
The second tier of public corporations would include firms that,
regardless of size, pose only limited risks to society, either because their
eventual failure would not threaten social welfare to a considerable extent, or
because their business does not affect the interests of a broad range of social
groups and local communities. These entities would be subject to a regulatory
framework typical of public companies, and their decision-making processes
would not be shaped by social concerns beyond a voluntary approach. In
other words, the corporate objective of tier-two corporations would remain
199. Posner, supra note 181, at 24.
200. Examples of environmental disasters made earlier in this Article serve to clarify this point,
but other entities too, like pharmaceutical corporations, may retain a social importance because of
the public interest inherent to their research and development (R&D) activity.
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aligned to the interest of shareholders as private corporate interests would
prevail over social ones.
The two-tier classification proposed under the ESC is based upon five
criteria that are designed to assess whether corporations can have a negative
impact on society. In essence, the degree to which firms trigger the
emergence of the five criteria will determine whether they fall under tier-one
or tier-two regulatory framework. It is useful at this stage to provide a brief
illustration of the five criteria employed under the ESC.
First, the entity’s size and number of employees at group level would
provide an initial parameter to determine whether the business activity should
attract sovereign control. A large workforce can shape decision-making,
particularly when a high number of jobs are at stake, as it is the case during
takeovers, for instance. Social concerns would also emerge when a city or a
regional community relies on a large corporation for occupation and strategic
industrial purposes.
The second criterion would also provide a means to quantify the entity’s
position in society, and it looks at group turnover. A very high turnover
should attract public scrutiny because of the fiscal and financial repercussions
that this may have. In particular, the audit of such entities would need to draw
specific attention to a range of financial and accounting issues, such as off-
balance sheet liabilities or the entity’s level of leverage.
The third criterion shifts the assessment onto another aspect of corporate
activity. It focuses on the geographical spread of the business, and is thus
directed to a large degree at multinational firms. Multinational entities benefit
from economies of scale that allow extracting value from society often due
to a decrease in competition. Their economic position also puts them in an
ideal place to exploit the benefit of regulatory arbitrage, particularly with
respect to tax issues. A higher degree of public scrutiny over these entities
would be needed to socialize the economic advantages that derive from this
organizational pattern and direct them toward more inclusive goals (beyond
profit-making for shareholders).
In connection with the geographical spread, the fourth criterion looks at
the range and nature of business activities. This has a twofold significance
because it firstly examines the degree to which firms embrace multiple areas
of business, therefore becoming conglomerates. This has increasingly been
the case within the financial services industry, where deregulation allowed
the proliferation of universal, too-big-to-fail institutions. As with the
previous criterion, the same rationale for sovereign control over the entity’s
decision-making would apply in this context. This criterion is also important
for a second reason, and it refers to the nature of the activity conducted by
the corporation, or the group. This, in turn, encompasses both a public interest
test over those activities (whether they attract broader societal concerns as it
is the case for instance for energy, pharmaceutical or media), and a test
concerning the level of risk that the activities pose on society (relevant
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example would be the environmental risks related to natural resources
extraction).
The fifth and final criterion looks at the externalities on social groups,
and it represents a synthesis of whether and to what degree corporate
activities can have a negative impact on a wider range of societal groups,
according to the first four criteria.
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS—WHY THE ENLIGHTENED SOVEREIGN
CONTROL?
This Article contends that the proposed institutional framework of tier-
one companies would provide legal certainty to the unresolved question of
the corporate objective. Firstly, it would have an impact on the dynamics of
board decision-making. The passing of major board resolutions would be
subject to the special powers vested in the professionals drawn from the
institutional body described earlier. Their majority would be needed in order
to approve the resolution, ensuring that due regard is given to the social
dimension of corporate strategies together with the business one. Equally, a
majority of the professionals would have powers of veto over high-risk
activities, or alternatively they could refer specific resolutions raising higher
concern to the professional body.201 Most importantly, these powers would
result in an ex ante gatekeeping function performed within the board of tier-
one corporations. This is so because the judgement of state professionals
would remain aligned with the social dimension of tier-one entities, also due
to their compensation structure.
Additionally, the proposed design would bring intellectual and
professional resources which are currently lacking from BoDs. It was argued
earlier in this Article that NEDs have failed to bring an expert and
independent perspective to curb the high-risk strategies (such as financial or
environmental) implemented by their firms. State professionals would
complement the expertise already available on BoDs because of their
different independent background, and this would allow them to depart from
shareholder-oriented bias. Their powers would essentially affect corporate
decision-making by pursuing the corporate objective in a more balanced and
contextual way. Drawing from some of the boards’ failures that characterized
the GFC, it can be argued that state professionals would be able to heed
warning signs raised by risk-managers, whereas directors of financial
institutions were incapable of doing so because they were hindered by
shareholder value bias and followed the irrational exuberance of traders,
motivated by lust for short-term profits.202 In essence, the intrinsically
201. Examples would be transactions whose long-term effects impact the firm’s amount of
leverage and thus threaten systemic stability, or takeovers within sensitive industries that impact
national interests.
202. See POSNER, supra note 126, at 80.
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truncated rationality of market actors, which has so far prevailed in BoDs’
decision-making, would be complemented by a more socially responsible
approach to business and a deeper awareness of its long-term implications.
CONCLUSION
This Article has advanced the urgency to recalibrate the corporate
objective of large public corporations toward more socially inclusive goals.
The analysis conducted in the first part of this Article reviewed the old-
standing dilemma to find a public interest justification to the managerial
power of large corporations. The quest of creating mechanisms of public
accountability was already recognized by Berle who relied on the optimistic
construction of his “public consensus” theory; more recently, Parkinson
further defined the problem by highlighting the void in democratic legitimacy
characterizing corporate management.
The difficulty to construct a viable model of corporate management,
encompassing both business and social interests, is reflected on the one hand
by the ambiguous ubiquity of shareholder value, which has survived a
number of crises and much criticism, and on the other hand by the reluctance
(particularly in the United Kingdom and United States) to adopt a stakeholder
orientation to corporate governance. The critique provided in Part II shows
that neither of the two models is suitable to deliver legal certainty in the
process of decision-making, and that problems of democratic legitimization
of managerial power have remained unresolved. The corporate scandals that
occurred in succession from the early 2000s amplified this void and suggest
that large public corporations need to embed wider societal interests among
their objectives.
This Article proposes a new model of corporate management, the
enlightened sovereign control, to fill this void. In constructing a two-tier
classification of public corporations, the ESC advocates a state-based
democratic intervention in the decision-making process of tier-one
companies. The aim of this model is to bring an external element of
judgement in the dynamics of BoDs in order to counter the intellectual and
cultural bias that persists within corporate and financial organizations.
Behavioral explanations put forward in Part III deconstructed the presumed
rationality of market-players’ decisions chiefly because of the persistence of
bias within corporate environments.203 Equally, evidence from corporate,
financial, and environmental disasters showed that BoDs’ strategies were
often not cognizant of the level of risk-taking that was being reached. This
justifies solutions that seek either an external regulation of the process of
decision-making or a change in the environment in which decisions are taken.
The ESC provides both the former, insofar as it brings external non-market-
203. See Langevoort, supra note 144, at 1241.
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based expertise on the board, and the latter, by shaping the environment in
which decisions are taken.
In addition, the state professionals drawn from the institutional body
described in Part III would constitute a new “knowledge-based” profession204
(by virtue of an ad-hoc educational path) capable of offering a deeper
awareness of critical decision-making processes and thus bring about much
needed balancing of different interests at stake.
204. It is worth specifying that the different intellectual backgrounds of state professionals would
be the result of a new profession that currently, despite similarities with the judiciary or academia
for instance, does not exist.
